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Sapere Aude: Critical Ontology and
the Case of Child Development
JAMES WONG Wilfrid Laurier University
Introduction
In Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, Vol. I, Michel Fou-
cault develops an account of the workings of modern political power. In
contrast to pre-modern political power, which Foucault identifies as ‘sov-
ereign power’ characterized by the Sovereign exercising power over the
life and death of his subjects, modern political power takes its task to be
the management and administration of life itself, through all the ways it
unfolds for individuals ~1980a: 138!. Foucault called this form of state
power ‘biopower.’ Biopower is organized around two poles: “an anatomo-
politics of the human body” and “a bio-politics of the population” ~Fou-
cault, 1980a: 139!. Both mechanisms combine to regulate persons and
groups of individuals through detailed knowledge of their bodies and
behaviour at every level of the social body. Rather than revealing its might
through public displays, as illustrated by the execution of Damiens in
Discipline and Punish ~1979!, biopower operates subtly by measuring,
appraising and normalizing individuals. Such detailed information about
individuals, however, requires the continual development of disciplines
~Foucault, 1980a: 144!. Foucault points out that “the man described for
us @by various disciplines# , whom we are invited to free, is already in
himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself ”
~1979: 30!. He warns that “at present, the problem lies . . . in the steep
rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-
ranging powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they
bring with them” ~1979: 306!. Against what he perceives to be the trend
toward yet more disciplinary networks meant to enmesh individuals,
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Foucault closes Discipline and Punish by foretelling a “distant roar of
battle” against the spread of such normalizing practices ~1979: 308!.
Given its alarming tone, one can imagine a series of questions raised
in response to Foucault’s critical analysis of biopower and its effects. What,
one might well ask, is to be done in the face of such biopower? Do we
simply abandon the advances we have gained in our knowledge of indi-
viduals? What alternatives to biopower are available to us? Foucault, how-
ever, leaves his readers hanging. As a consequence, some of Foucault’s
critics have described his various genealogical studies of psychological,
medical and ‘educational’ practices and institutions as “anarchist clap-
trap” and “self-indulgent radical chic” ~Rorty, 1986: 47!, and “infantile
leftism . . . committed to nothing more than an elaborate pun on the word
‘discipline’” ~Walzer, 1986: 51, 64!. Others choose a different tack. They
take Foucault to task for not providing “normative yardsticks” ~Haber-
mas, 1986: 108!. In their view, Foucault cannot provide normative foun-
dations for his partisan critiques of modernity ~Habermas, 1987: 276;
Fraser, 1987: ch. 1–3!. Michael Walzer echoes this line of criticism when
he writes, “Foucault makes no demand on us that we adopt this or that
critical principle or replace these disciplinary norms with some other set
of norms. He is not an advocate” ~1986: 65!. But, Walzer ~1986: 65!
asks, what then are we to do since “there may be some @positions# that
we have ‘good reasons’ not to support”?
In this paper, I argue that in Foucault’s later work, in particular “What
is Enlightenment?” ~1984! and “The ethic of care for the self as a prac-
tice of freedom” ~1988a!, his proposed positive program of practical cri-
tique, which he calls ‘critical ontology,’ provides a response to his critics.
In mapping out the project, Foucault addresses the issue of normative
yardsticks as well as the question of what is to be done about the prac-
tices and institutions which are constitutive of biopower. Critical ontol-
ogy is concerned with the possibility of self-transformation, i.e., “work
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” ~Foucault, 1984:
47!. A central concern of the project is to understand how we have con-
stituted ourselves as the kinds of subjects we are. The goal of critical
ontology, however, is practical. It seeks to “separate out, from the con-
tingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being,
doing or thinking what we are, do, or think” ~Foucault, 1984: 46!. How-
ever, it may be objected that, since Foucault emphasizes going beyond
contingencies, it appears that he is guilty of committing a kind of genetic
fallacy: in unmasking the social relations which constitute the conditions
for the possibility of certain concepts, in particular normative ones, and
practices, these concepts and practices are shown to be mere fabrications
and can be rejected.
I will defend Foucault against such a charge by using concepts and
practices in child development as an illustration of his project of critical
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ontology. The example of child development is fitting for a political theory
discussion because the development model of childhood is now central
to the practices and policies of healthcare providers, social workers and
educators. Such practices and policies aim to enhance the abilities of
young individuals to eventually be both citizens and autonomous agents.
Yet the effects of these policies on individuals are not always positive.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of critical ontol-
ogy for practices grounded in the model of child development. It should
be emphasized at the outset that the focus of this paper is concerned
with the effects of the developmental model of childhood, or ‘develop-
mental thinking,’ on how children are perceived and dealt with today espe-
cially in the West. The focus of this paper is not intended to be a discussion
specifically on the impact of Foucault’s project of critical ontology on
how we ought to think about children’s education, including specific pol-
icy initiatives; such analysis will have to wait for another occasion. The
contribution of this paper is more methodological than policy oriented.
Nonetheless, I hope that the present discussion is in some small way a
prolegomenon to any future policy discussion.1
Abstract. This paper argues that Foucault’s proposed positive program of practical critique in
his later work, which he calls ‘critical ontology,’ provides a response to his critics. The goal of
critical ontology is to “separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the
possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think.” However, it may be
objected that, since Foucault emphasizes going beyond contingencies, it appears that he is guilty
of committing a kind of genetic fallacy. I will defend Foucault against such a charge by using
concepts and practices in child development as an illustration. The example of child develop-
ment is fitting for political theorizing because the development model of childhood is now
central to the practices and policies of healthcare providers, social workers and educators. Such
practices and policies aim to enhance the abilities of individuals to be both citizens and auton-
omous agents. Yet the effects of these policies on individuals are not always positive. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the implications of critical ontology for practices grounded in
the model of child development.
Résumé. Cet article cherche à démontrer que le programme positif de critique pratique que
Foucault propose dans ses derniers ouvrages, et qu’il qualifie d’une «ontologie critique,» con-
stitue une réponse à ses détracteurs. Le but de cette ontologie critique est de dégager «de la
contingence qui nous a fait être ce que nous sommes la possibilité de ne plus être, faire ou
penser ce que nous sommes, faisons ou pensons». Néanmoins, il est possible d’objecter que
Foucault commet une sorte d’erreur génétique, puisqu’il insiste sur la nécessité de dépasser les
contingences. Je cherche à defendre Foucault contre cette accusation en utilisant les concepts et
pratiques du développement des enfants comme illustration. L’exemple du développement des
enfants convient à la théorie politique puisque le modèle d’aménagement de l’enfance est main-
tenant au coeur des pratiques et des politiques de ceux qui travaillent dans les secteurs de la
santé, de l’aide social, et de l’éducation. Telles pratiques et politiques ont comme but d’accroître
la capacité des individus d’agir en même temps comme citoyens et des êtres autonomes. Pour-
tant, les effets de ces politiques sur des individus ne sont pas toujours bénéfiques. L’article se
conclut par une analyse des implications d’une ontologie critique pour des pratiques fondées
sur le modèle du développement des enfants.
To be sure, political theorists in the Modern period, Hobbes and
Locke for example, and, even earlier, Plato in The Republic, discussed
children in their works. However, Hobbes’s concern with children was
primarily in the context of an account of the justification of political
authority, while Locke’s case is more complicated. There were two con-
texts for his writings on children. In his Two Treatises on Government
~1689!, Locke was interested in providing an alternative to the account
of authority put forth by Filmer and Hobbes. In Some Thoughts Concern-
ing Education ~1693!, he wanted to address the issue of how best to raise
future citizens. David Archard tells us that in Some Thoughts “Locke
writes of children as the recipients of an ideal upbringing, citizens in the
making, fledgling but imperfect reasoners, and blank sheets filled by expe-
rience” ~1998: 85!. Nonetheless, neither Hobbes nor Locke wrote about
children in today’s framework of childhood development, as I shall argue.
It is a far cry from the kind of general observation that Locke makes
about children’s abilities in his Some Thoughts, such as when a child can
talk, “it is time he should begin to learn to read . . . @But# a great care is
to be taken that it be made a business to him, nor he look on it as a task”
~1996: 113! to contemporary experiment-based claims about young chil-
dren which state that, for example, from a few weeks of age on they can
distinguish people from inanimate objects ~Bradley, 1989: 127!.2
It should be noted that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s general remarks
about children’s abilities in his famous work on education, Emile ~1762!,
also do not fall under today’s framework of child development. Like
Locke, Rousseau emphasized the distinctiveness of childhood as a phase
in human life. He tells us that children have their “own ways of seeing,
thinking and feeling” ~57!. For instance, he remarks that “from the first
children hear spoken language; we speak to them before they can under-
stand. Their vocal organs are still stiff, and only gradually lend them-
selves to the reproduction of the sounds heard; it is doubtful whether
these sounds are heard distinctly as we hear them” ~37!. Both Locke’s
and Rousseau’s remarks, however, are based on unsystematic observa-
tions of children, and not grounded in experimental studies. In Emile,
Rousseau tells us that “we know not what nature allows us to be, none of
us has measured the possible difference between man and man” ~29, ital-
ics added!. Perhaps, contemporary psychological research will show that
children are much more able at various tasks than either Locke or Rous-
seau had supposed.
Critical Ontology
Given his scathing critiques of various features of modern societies, Fou-
cault has been taken to be a standard bearer for anti-Enlightenment
thought. But contrary to his critics, Foucault sees himself as following in
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the Enlightenment tradition, at least as outlined in Kant’s 1784 essay
“What is Enlightenment?” In his essay, Kant tells us that enlightenment
consists of “the escape of men from their self-incurred tutelage” ~1963: 9!.
To wake themselves from dogmatic slumbers, individuals, both singu-
larly and collectively, must make use of their reason to challenge taken-
for-granted assumptions guiding their beliefs. In short, they must analyze
the state of affairs in which they find themselves. Hence, Kant proclaims
Sapere Aude ~‘dare to know’ taken from Horace! to be the motto for the
Enlightenment.3
Foucault’s reading of Kant’s essay is that the hallmark of enlighten-
ment is the attitude of challenging assumptions about what we know and
how we act.4 For Foucault, the project of enlightenment commits us to a
“permanent critique” ~Foucault, 1984: 43!. Lewis White Beck points out
in the Preface to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, that Kant
had already declared “our age @to be# , in especial degree, the age of crit-
icism, and to criticism everything must submit” ~Kant, 1963: 8 note 4!.
Foucault is aware, of course, that much of Kant’s philosophy is dedicated
to ‘critique’ as a systematic philosophy. In The Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant writes that “all the interests of my reason, speculative as well as prac-
tical, combine in the three following questions: What can I know? What
ought I to do? What may I hope?” ~1965: 635!. Critical philosophy then
yields theories about, as Foucault puts it, “what can be known, what must
be done or what may be hoped” ~1984: 38!. For Foucault, however, the
project of a permanent critique will not attempt to “identify the universal
structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action,” but rather, it
will be “a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgres-
sion” ~1984: 46, 45!. The project, he tells us, implies a series of histori-
cal inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not
be oriented retrospectively toward the ‘essential kernel of rationality’ that
can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved
in any event; they will be oriented toward the ‘contemporary limits of the
necessary,’ that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for
the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects ~1984: 43!.
By ‘limits’ Foucault means those taken-for-granted ways of think-
ing and acting which form the backdrop to our behaviour.5 A critique of
limits would then be an analysis of how we have constituted ourselves as
subjects who think and act in particular ways in order to open up new
spaces for thought and action ~Norris, 1994: 169!.
Because of its connection with self-constitution, i.e., different ways
to be a person, Foucault also describes the permanent critique as a “crit-
ical ontology” of ourselves.6 Foucault suggests that inquiries in critical
ontology could be organized under three interrelated headings: “How are
we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we consti-
tuted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we
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constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” ~Foucault, 1984: 49!
Foucault describes these areas as “the axes of knowledge, power and eth-
ics” ~1984: 49!, representing different domains in which we constitute
ourselves as subjects. For instance, under knowledge, what can be known
about us as objects of knowledge at a particular moment will inform our
thinking both of ourselves as persons and of the possibilities available to
us. As an illustration, consider the idea of therapy in contemporary life.
Therapy appears to play a prominent role in Western culture today. Think
of the volumes of self-help literature available in bookstores, and the talk
of various addictions along with the establishment of the appropriate
recovery programs. In the West, individuals have constituted several pos-
sible ways to be a person through what they say, think and do in terms of
therapy, from victim or addict, to survivor or recovering addict, to con-
fessor and many more permutations. Of course, therapy is but one orga-
nizing principle informing possible ways to be a person in contemporary
life. The point of critical ontology is to examine ideas and principles that
organize our habitual ways of thinking and acting in order to think and
act differently.
Foucault does not intend the project of critical ontology as a “ges-
ture of rejection,” but rather as a practical critique for possible transfor-
mations ~1984: 45!. He suggests that the project take on an “experimental”
attitude towards “contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where
change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this
change should take” ~1984: 46!. One of the key issues addressed by crit-
ical ontology is what Foucault calls the “paradox of the relations of capac-
ity and @disciplinary# power” ~1984: 47!. The ability of individuals to be
autonomous agents is linked with the development of capacity for thought
and action ~Tully, 1999: 93!. Thus encouraging and fostering such capa-
bilities would enable individuals to approach practices critically. But the
capacity for thought and action are developed within disciplinary matri-
ces of pedagogical and medical institutions, in which individuals are also
normalized and placed in a hierarchy. Here think of Foucault’s remarks
in Discipline and Punish where the routinization of tasks and the very
spatial arrangements of individuals are geared towards the normalization
and hierarchization of individuals ~cf. 177–194!. The question Foucault
raises is, “How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the
intensification of power relations?” ~Foucault, 1984: 48!7 Notice that, in
raising the question, Foucault is not claiming that all that is given to us
now as universal and necessary is problematic. His project is more mod-
est, but no less audacious. It seeks to examine “in what is given to us as
universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is
singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints” ~1984: 45!.
As suggested by the idea of an “experimental attitude,” the practical cri-
tique is intended to challenge the taken-for-granted necessity of prac-
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tices and the concepts and values informing such practices, and “where
change is possible and desirable . . . to determine the precise form this
change should take” ~1984: 45!. I will explore how such an experimental
attitude might work in practice in the case study of child development.
The discussion focuses on Foucault’s concern about the “paradox of capac-
ity and power” as applied to the case of child development.8 However,
before that discussion can get off the ground, I will first consider some
criticisms of Foucault’s project.
Enlightenment Blackmail—answering critics
“How can Foucault’s self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of the
Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable criticisms of this very
form of knowledge of modernity?” Jürgen Habermas asks ~1986: 106!
Rather than working within the Enlightenment tradition, he argues that
Foucault’s work actually undermines “modernity and its language games”
~1987: 283!. Against criticisms such as Habermas’, Foucault warns against
what he calls the “blackmail of the Enlightenment” ~1984, 42!. One is
either for or against the Enlightenment tout court. Take, for example, the
idea of ‘reason’: one “recognizes reason or casts it into irrationalism—as
if it were not possible to write a rational criticism of rationality” ~Foucault,
1989: 242!. But the dichotomy between either supporting reason or irratio-
nalism is a false one, and Foucault is right to reject it. As a set of polit-
ical, economic, social, institutional and cultural transformations, the
accomplishments of the Enlightenment are still felt today. Yet some of the
changes resulting from the Enlightenment period may prove to be in con-
flict with the current autonomy of individuals. It is the task of critical
ontology to unmask such arbitrary constraints. Foucault’s project, then,
does not repudiate the values or the institutions which fall under the broad
notions of ‘modernity’ or ‘Enlightenment.’9 It is quite possible that some
values and practices should turn out to be indispensable for our auton-
omy today. But, “where change is possible and desirable,” Foucault adds,
the project will attempt “to determine the precise form this change should
take” ~1984: 46!. Critical ontology, then, is not a global anarchist-
deconstructionist project but a local and experimental, hence tentative, one.
Foucault acknowledges that the project of critical ontology aban-
dons “hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access
to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our
historical limits” ~1984: 47!. From this admission, however, it does not
follow that no critical judgements are possible. One must still provide
reasons and evidence for why certain practices must be changed and how,
except these reasons will not be cast as universal claims ~Rouse, 1994:
112!. We can give partial justification for any particular suggestion by
using other non-problematic practices or discourses. The transformed prac-
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tices will then be put back in play. If in time those practices were to
prove problematic, then the critical process would begin anew. Changes,
according to this view, are always provisional. The process of permanent
critique is not dissimilar to the work of sailors on Neurath’s boat rebuild-
ing their ship while still at sea.10
But what do these changes accomplish? Would the end result be just
substitution of one regime of power for another, as his critics suggest?
First, Foucault does not conceive of power just in terms of domination.
His concerns are with relations of power in various settings, such as the
family and other institutions, rather than a theory of power per se. “When
I speak of power relations,” Foucault tells us:
I am not referring to Power—with a capital P—dominating and imposing its
rationality upon the totality of the social body. In fact, there are power rela-
tions. They are multiple; they have different forms, they can be in play in fam-
ily relations, or within an institution, or an administration—or between a
dominating and a dominated class . . . . It is a field of analysis and not at all a
reference to any unique instance. @Furthermore,# in studying these power rela-
tions, I in no way construct a theory of Power. But I wish to know how the
reflexivity of the subject and the discourse of truth are linked—“How can the
subject tell the truth about itself?”—and I think that relations of power exert-
ing themselves upon one another constitute one of the determining elements
in this relation I am trying to analyze. ~1988b: 38!
For him, the idea of ‘relations of power’ is a general notion, describ-
ing the ways in which individuals direct the behaviour of one another
and themselves ~1983: 219!. These relationships range from one-sided
domination of one over others to consensual and reciprocal relations
between individuals. Foucault does not deny that there are cases of dom-
ination. For him, a relationship of power is not necessarily identical with
a relation of domination. “When an individual or a social group man-
ages to block a field of relations of power,” he writes, “to render them
impassive and invariable and to prevent all reversibility of movement . . .
we are facing what can be called a state of domination. It is certain that
in such a state the practice of liberty does not exist or exists only unilat-
erally or is extremely confined and limited” ~1988a: 3!. Individuals in
relations of power other than domination, however, have the liberty to
coordinate their actions in particular ways. In this kind of coordination
problem, individuals align themselves according to certain goals that each
wants to achieve. The relationship may or may not be hierarchical, depend-
ing on the context in which it is situated. Nonetheless even if it were
hierarchical, individuals in various subject positions would be constrained.
When a manager or a department chair plans to implement new initia-
tives, she or he can do so only if others ‘accept’ the plans and work within
them. Individuals in such circumstance can choose to act in accordance
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or resist. They can even attempt to modify the way in which they are
connected to each other to the degree they can, by changing the rules
governing the relation itself. In this sense, the relation of power is recip-
rocal between individuals, and requires that individuals have the free-
dom to make choices ~Rouse, 1994: 105ff; Tully, 1999: 132!. Change is,
therefore, possible.11 Indeed, the problem, Foucault writes, “is to find
out where resistance is going to be organized” ~1988a: 12!.
Second, Foucault is suspicious of overarching claims about libera-
tion or emancipation.12 Aside from the potential of merely uttering empty
platitudes, the danger in such speculative universalist claims is that in
their name, many heinous acts have been committed. Foucault reminds
us that “we know from experience that the claim to escape from the sys-
tem of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of
another society . . . has led only to the return of the most dangerous tra-
ditions” ~1984: 46!. But he does not deny that, in concrete instances,
liberation exists. “When a colonial people tries to free itself of its colo-
nizer,” he tells us, “that is truly an act of liberation, in the strict sense of
the word . . . . @But# this act of liberation is not sufficient to establish the
practices of liberty that later on will be necessary for this people, this
society and these individuals to decide upon receivable and acceptable
forms of their existence or political society” ~1988a: 2–3!. Foucault here
echoes Kant’s view in his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant tells us
that “an age cannot bind itself and ordain to put the succeeding one into
such a condition that it cannot extend its ~at best very occasional! knowl-
edge, purify itself of errors, and progress in general enlightenment” ~1963:
7!. Rather than schemes of transformation that seek to establish ‘free-
dom’ once and for all, Foucault argues that we should instead focus on
specific kinds of transformations concerning our ways of being and think-
ing. “I prefer even these partial transformations that have been made . . .
to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have
repeated throughout the twentieth century” ~Foucault, 1984: 46–47!.
Genetic Fallacy
There is another objection. Foucault tells us one of the aims of his his-
torical studies is “to show people that a lot of things that are a part of
their landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some
very precise historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of
universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of
institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how
many changes can still be made” ~1988c: 11!. Showing that certain ways
of thinking and acting are historically contingent, however, does not prove
that they are false or even problematic. If one were to hold that the
unmasking of power relations behind concepts and practices by itself dem-
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onstrates that propositions informed by those concepts are false, then one
would be committing a genetic fallacy.
Foucault, however, is well aware of this possible objection. He tells
us that “we can show, for example, that the medicalisation of madness
. . . has been linked, at some time or other, to a whole series of social or
economic processes, but also to institutions and practices of power. This
fact in no way impairs the scientific validity of the therapeutic efficacy
of psychiatry. It does not guarantee it but it does not cancel it out either”
~1988a: 16!. Consider another example. Suppose, Foucault says, math-
ematics is linked to structures of power. What follows from that? Fou-
cault tells us that this does not “mean that mathematics is only a game of
power but that mathematics is linked, in a certain way and without impair-
ing its validity, to games and institutions of power” ~1988a: 16, italics
added!. In these passages, Foucault acknowledges that there is an episte-
mological or evidential side to knowledge claims. Whether or not a par-
ticular claim is true will depend on the evidence. Nevertheless, knowledge
claims may be linked to and affected by relations of power. Feminist
epistemologists have argued that not everyone is allowed to participate.
Lorraine Code points out that the social order establishes structures of
credulity and incredulity which may exclude potentially good informants
~1995: 75!. Under such circumstances, it is likely that “there are truths
which could have been and should have been transmitted, but were not”
~Fricker, 1998: 173!.13
For Foucault, however, knowledge is not reducible to power, even
though they directly imply each another ~1979: 27!. In an interview, Fou-
cault complains that “when you point out to @others# that there can be a
relation between truth and power, they say: ‘Ah good! Then it is not the
truth’” ~Foucault, 1988a: 17!. The general perception of his idea of power0
knowledge is that knowledge is reducible to power. Foucault chafes at
such an interpretation. He remarks acidly:
I know that, as far as the general public is concerned, I am the guy who said
that knowledge merged with power, that it was no more than a thin mask thrown
over the structures of domination and that those structures were always ones
of oppression, confinement, and so on. @This# point is so absurd as to be laugh-
able. If I had said, or meant, that knowledge was power, I would have said
so, and having said so, I would have had nothing more to say, since, having
made them identical, I don’t see why I would have taken the trouble to show
the different relations between them . . . . Those who say that for me knowl-
edge is the mask of power seem to me to be quite incapable of understanding
~1988d: 264–265!.
A full treatment of Foucault’s idea of power0knowledge is beyond
the scope of this paper, but perhaps it is enough for our purposes to point
out that his studies reveal the connections between various knowledge
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claims and the practices by which they are justified and become intelli-
gible. In “The Discourse on Language,” Foucault tells us that “a propo-
sition must fulfil some onerous and complex conditions before it can be
admitted within a discipline; before it can be pronounced true or false it
must be, as Monsieur Canguilhem might say, ‘within the true’” ~1972:
224!. Yet, as Linda Alcoff points out, the “rules of discursive formations
do not mandate specific truth-values for specific sentences, but open
up a delimited space in which some statements can be meaningfully
expressed” ~1996: 123!. Since discursive formations, which are moulded
by both intellectual and social events, only delineate what can be stated
and what is capable of having truth values, it would be wrong to attribute
to Foucault the view that knowledge is reducible to power relations.14
The historical inquiries in critical ontology reveal the connections
between knowledge and power in various taken-for-granted practices. That
changes are necessary in these customary ways of thinking and acting
will be shown by problematic practices themselves because they pose
arbitrary or unnecessary constraints on individuals.
Child Development
As an illustration of the workings of critical ontology, consider the case
of child development. If we peruse literature from pediatricians’ offices
or off-the-shelf self-help books for parents, one idea that leaps out imme-
diately is that children must develop according to physical, cognitive and
psychological norms. Today, these norms are taken for granted, yet they
are a fairly new concept, barely 200 years old.
Of course, people have always been aware that children grew up, or
‘developed’, at different rates. How could they not? But their notion of
development was not “theoretically well-formed” ~Archard, 1993: 30!.
In contrast, today, most people, especially in the West, are guided by a
scientific idea of development, as a consequence of systematic explora-
tions of childhood from the perspectives of biology, psychology, psychi-
atry and much else over the past century and a half. For example, consider
Shakespeare’s sketch of growing up in As You Like It:
All the worlds’ a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His act being seven stages. At first, the infant,
Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms.
Then the whining schoolboy with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like snail
Unwillingly to school. And then the lover,
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
Made to his mistress’ eyebrow. Then, a soldier . . . . ~1994: 151!
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Although the bard recognized infancy and childhood as different cat-
egories, there is neither the mention of age nor any fine-grained details
about what children ought to have achieved or acquired at different times,
as we would expect from recent pamphlets. Individuals in general, and
children in particular, were not yet objects of scientific knowledge.15 For
knowledge of children’s development to emerge, society must be orga-
nized in such a way that childhood is recognized to be a distinct period
from adulthood. Furthermore, the view that there is a rate at which indi-
viduals developed and that their development could be compared had not
yet been advanced. Once that measure is acquired, development, as a
norm, can be deployed in the detailed management of individuals. But
the techniques and technologies for such knowledge would not be invented
until the mid-nineteenth century.
The claim that childhood is a particularly modern invention is, of
course, not new. Phillippe Ariès made such a claim in his landmark Cen-
turies of Childhood ~1962!. But Ariès’s analysis is flawed. He applied
contemporary attitudes, assumptions and concerns about children to the
past. Since present attitudes were not found in past societies, he con-
cluded that such societies lacked a concept of childhood altogether. But
all that he could have claimed was that they lacked our concept of child-
hood. By definition to be a child is to be not yet an adult, and all soci-
eties make this distinction between those who are and those who are not
yet adults ~Archard, 1993: 22–7!. My interest in this paper is in how the
idea of development became a central organizing principle in the way we
think about and interact with children, parents and care-providers and
how such developmental thinking may pose unnecessary limitations on
individuals.
Knowledge
A key figure in the formation of knowledge on the topic of children’s
development was the Belgian astronomer-statistician Adolphe Quetelet.
For him, just as there were laws governing the heavens and human soci-
eties, there were likewise laws governing the development of man’s var-
ious powers. Statistical thinking was the key to uncovering such laws.
Quetelet applied the ‘Law of Error’ used by astronomers at the time to
human populations. Man’s thinking was ready for the idea that there was
a truth to be discovered about man’s development, one which governed
every aspect of his maturation. Unlike Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
who based their views on single or isolated observations, Quetelet used
data from various anthropometric studies to find out what the average
person would be like at various points in his or her development. In his
view, the ‘average man’ ~l’homme moyen! was the embodiment of the
physical and moral attributes of his people. He claimed that the features
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of the ‘average man’ could be considered a “type of perfection” for a
group at a specific time, since extreme variations would cancel each other
out. The features of the average man would serve as the standard against
which an individual’s development would be measured. Average features
represent the normal, or healthy, state for individuals in a population
~Hacking, 1990: ch. 19!. Average values, as norms, are no mere arithme-
tic constructs. They have real effects on people’s lives: normal connotes
health, abnormal suggests deviance. People are motivated, then, to mould
themselves according to such norms.
Educators and Evolutionary Thinking
Educators, too, had high hopes that anthropometric studies would yield
knowledge about the laws of mental development in children. They had
a practical interest in such studies. For them, the key in making peda-
gogy more effective was to understand how the child’s mind unfolded.
When educational practices are adapted to the natural developmental order
of children’s abilities and interests, such practices would finally be able
to do what they were supposed to do: mould these children into future
citizens. The subject of mental development in children quickly became
a hot topic for discussion in women’s clubs and teachers’ organizations
in the mid-1800s. G. Stanley Hall of Clark University, a founding
member of the American Psychological Association, tapped into this enthu-
siasm and put teachers and parents to work. Questionnaire after question-
naire about children’s behaviour was filled out. It is as though the mere
gathering of numbers and calculating of averages and presentation of
tables and graphs guaranteed that their findings would reveal yet more
laws governing children’s development ~Wong, 1994: ch. 4!.
There was another reason for interest in children’s mental develop-
ment at the time. Those involved in natural history and ‘evolutionary think-
ing’ saw ‘development’ as the organizing principle in Nature. Robert
Chambers, the author of the anonymously published popular work, Ves-
tiges of the Natural History of Creation ~1844!, tells us that “the inor-
ganic has one final comprehensive law GRAVITATION. The organic, the
other great department of mundane things, rests in like manner on one
law, and that is DEVELOPMENT” ~1844: 360!. The development of mind
was seen to separate human beings from the animal world. Children’s
mental development was of particular interest because the child was
thought to be situated between the animal and the human. A number of
papers on children’s behaviour were published in the second half of the
nineteenth century. For instance, Charles Darwin’s “A Biographical Sketch
of the Infant” was published in Mind in 1877. The trickle of publications
would soon become a flood.
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Knowledge, Power, Ethics
As the account just provided shows, developments in statistical and evo-
lutionary thinking and worries about population health and education con-
verged to create a space ~conceptual and institutional! for the emergence
of a science of child development. Hall’s sloppy questionnaires would
give way to more rigorous tests, such as Binet and Simon’s intelligence
test in 1904. Such tests provided a simple way to obtain knowledge about
children’s behaviour, scholastic or otherwise. They made it possible to
reason objectively about children in developmental terms both physical
and psychological. For instance, claims such as ‘a one-year-old boy should
weigh 10 kg’ or ‘two-year-olds can use words such as I, me and you’ are
now taken to be true or false. More importantly, the various tests started
to change the way in which research on child development was done.
Children would be studied in controlled laboratory settings. Conceptual
tools, techniques and instruments would be developed and refined to ver-
ify claims about children’s development. Pediatrics and developmental
psychology would become mature sciences, eventually providing us with
now familiar claims such as ‘children between the ages two and four
have no real conception of abstract principles guiding classification.’
Although modern societal relations of power are constitutive of the con-
ditions for the possibility for knowledge of children’s development—for
example, separation of childhood, concerns about populations and edu-
cation, and so on—they do not specify the truth values of individual
claims; rather they provide the material and conceptual conditions for
the possibility of such knowledge.
Knowledge of children’s development has also changed the way we
think about and do things for children. Children are now seen as individ-
uals who develop more or less normally, according to physical and psy-
chological norms. Such knowledge has an immediate impact on parents.
Parents were told by self-styled pundits, like James Sully, the Grote Pro-
fessor of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of London ~and a
child-study enthusiast!, that raising children was no longer “a matter of
instinct and unthinking rules of thumb @but# has become the subject of
profound and perplexing discussion. Mothers—the right sort of mothers
that is—feel they must know au fond this . . . creature which they are
called upon to direct onto the safe road to manhood” ~Sully 1903, cited
in Ross, 1972: 284!. The message was clear: good parents would seek
out and learn the latest findings on how to raise their children. Parents,
especially middle-class parents, sought out that knowledge in pamphlets
and popular magazines, like Parent’s Magazine. Development became part
of their working vocabulary in their dealings with children and with one
another. They willingly transformed their homes and made themselves
into the kinds of persons that this knowledge led them to believe they
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needed to be. Who wouldn’t want their children to be healthy and nor-
mal? It may be true that, as the popular saying goes, ‘it takes a village to
raise a child.’ but, with the scientific notion of development, that village
had better include, or at least have access to, an expert or two.
Even if we moved away from the rigid thinking about development,
reflected in various developmental charts, as recommended by popular
writers like Dr. Benjamin Spock, and pediatricians themselves,16 how
could we today completely avoid thinking in terms of development in
our interactions with children? Two recent British studies tracked the cog-
nitive, social and emotional outcomes of children classified as small for
their gestational age. These studies show that, although these children
are less likely to excel academically, they do not suffer any other bad
outcomes socially and emotionally ~Owens, 2001!. But even earlier, long
before the child is born, indicators have been established for the fetus,
marking it as a developing being. We believe that it is in the nature of
children that they ‘develop,’ i.e., their growth is governed by develop-
mental norms. But we inculcate that belief in children and in ourselves.
In the West, the first image a parent sees of her or his child is likely an
ultrasound image of the fetus taken at a prescribed checkup of fetal devel-
opment during pregnancy. Furthermore, think about the toys and games
for children. They are designed with the aim of promoting certain devel-
opmentally appropriate skills. Consumers are very much aware of the
age-appropriate recommendations of such games. Think about schools.
The whole curriculum is based on fostering skills in a developmentally
appropriate way. Such mundane practices and attitudes entrench the con-
cept of development in our culture.
Recall the three kinds of questions examined by critical ontology:
“How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we
constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How
are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” ~Foucault, 1984:
49! These are inquiries into the axes of knowledge, power and ethics,
different domains in which we constitute ourselves as subjects. In the
example of child development discussed in the previous paragraphs, we
have seen how individuals, in particular children, have become objects
of knowledge, and how individuals, parents and other care providers have
willingly entered into various relations of power, guiding their behav-
iour. The analyses there focused on the domains of knowledge and power.
What about ethics? The relationship between children and parents, between
children and experts, and parents and experts, are all informed by the
knowledge we have about development. And that knowledge has also
shaped the way we think about our responsibilities in terms of caring for
children, for example legislation on child abandonment, corporal punish-
ment and so on. Such ethical demands have normalizing effects on indi-
viduals. However, these effects are asymmetrically borne. For instance,
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mothers, who are typically the primary care-providers of their children,
bear the brunt of the burdens; the hardships are multiplied for those in
marginalized situations, such as single teenaged mothers.
Conclusion
What, then, are the implications of a practical critique for child develop-
ment? As the discussion in the previous sections illustrates, an analysis
inspired by Foucault’s notion of critical ontology shows how develop-
ment itself became a central organizing principle in contemporary West-
ern societies. Such reasoning about children has also penetrated the
thinking of other traditions on the topic of children’s growing up. Among
the Native peoples in the Canadian far north, formal schooling now inter-
rupts traditional communal practices, such as hunting ~Owens, 2001;
Roundtable, 1999: 167!. Yet attention should be paid to these other child-
rearing practices, since they may provide valuable insights into children’s
growing-up process. The variability in child rearing provides a rich
resource to help us understand Western practices. This is not a rejection
of the vast body of knowledge now available on child development, but
rather a call to consider it critically. Far from advocating anarchism, or
worse nihilism, Foucault himself tells us that his genealogical analyses
do not “vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance or non-knowledge” ~1980b:
84!. Instead, they allow individuals to “question the truth on its effects
of power and question power on its discourses on truth” ~1997: 32!. The
point is not that we can do without knowledge, or truth: “nothing has . . .
proved that we could define a strategy exterior to @knowledge or truth# .
It is indeed in this field of obligation to truth that we sometimes can
avoid in one way or another the effects of a domination” ~1988a: 15!. In
his view, changes can only be brought about “not by playing a game that
was a complete stranger to the game of truth, but in playing it otherwise
or in playing . . . other trumps in the game of truth” ~1988a: 15!
A historical inquiry into development shows that the idea of devel-
opment cannot be neatly offered up in an either0or dilemma: either you
accept development or you reject it. But, in grasping the workings of the
normalizing effects of knowledge about child development on individu-
als, parents and other care providers have a richer knowledge base to
make judgements about children’s growing up and child rearing prac-
tices. Knowledge of children’s physical or psychological development can
tell us when something has gone seriously wrong. However, pursuing the
standards set out by developmental schedules too single-mindedly could
be disastrous for children. In choosing to use their knowledge about child
development critically, perhaps in conjunction with other models of how
children grow up, individuals would disrupt the normalizing effects of
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such knowledge. It is important not to overstate the claim however. Indi-
vidual cases of resistance may not lead to a disruption in the practices
and institutions of child development. Such ‘macro-level’ changes will
require much else, including the acceptance of other, including non-
Western, accounts of child rearing.
As the case study of child development illustrates, the tasks laid out
by critical ontology—demonstrating the historical contingency in our
present ways of understanding and organizing ourselves, and imagining
other possibilities—would seem to be key components in framing possi-
ble transformations. Such changes are, as noted earlier, provisional. They
may or may not continue to contribute to the autonomy of individuals at
some other juncture. Nonetheless, that they now remove some of the arbi-
trary constraints on a person’s ability to act would seem to suggest that
increasing the capacity for autonomy in individuals is possible without a
concomitant increase in the effects of disciplinary power on them.
Notes
1 I would like to thank one referee for the JOURNAL for emphasizing the importance of
making this point plain.
2 Bradley is here commenting on Jerome Bruner’s research on the interaction between
adults and young infants.
3 The motto had already been adopted in 1736 by the Society of the Friends of Truth,
an important group in the German Enlightenment ~Kant, 1963: 3!.
4 Attitude is contrasted with analytics, the latter being Foucault’s term for formal theory
~Habermas, 1986: 107!.
5 According to James Tully, limits are “any of the multiplicity of ways of speaking,
thinking and acting, of being conscious of ourselves as human subjects” ~1999: 92!.
These limits are taken for granted, “functioning as the . . . horizon of @the subject’s#
questions and contests” ~1999: 93!.
6 Foucault also gives ‘critical ontology’ the ironic name ‘historical ontology’. Of all
the branches of philosophical inquiry, ontology would appear to be the least histori-
cally inclined.
7 Foucault was already aware in Discipline and Punish of the ‘double bind’ of the
Enlightenment. He tells us that the “development and generalization of disciplinary
mechanisms constituted the other, dark side of the process @of modernity# . . . The
Enlightenment which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” ~1979:
222!.
8 In his later works, Foucault is also concerned with the ethics of self-fashioning, and
he expands on this theme in “What is Enlightenment” with the discussion of dandy-
ism. However, the ethics of self-fashioning are aimed at mature agents and not chil-
dren. Furthermore, in contrast to Kant’s insistence on autonomy in his 1784 essay,
Foucault tells us that “the care for self implies also a relationship to the other to the
extent that, in order to really care for self, one must listen to the teachings of a mas-
ter. One needs a guide, a counsellor, a friend—someone who will tell you the truth.
Thus, the problem of relationship with others is present all along this development of
care for self ” ~1988a: 7!.
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9 Foucault tells us that critical ontology examines “in what is given to us as universal,
necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and
the product of arbitrary constraints” ~1984: 45!.
10 James Tully tells us that “the modification in practice provides in turn a test against
which the original conceptual tools are assessed and reformulated and put into prac-
tice again, thereby forming a ‘permanent critique’” ~1999: 99!.
11 Foucault claims that “in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of
resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance . . . there would be no rela-
tions of power” ~1988a: 12!.
12 As such, the ethos of continual critique applies reflexively to Foucault’s own project
as well.
13 See also Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff ’s discussion of midwives in relation to
modern medical knowledge ~1995!.
14 As Paul Rabinow points out, critical ontology does not challenge whether or not a
particular claim is true or false. If the discipline were a mature science, there would
be well-established procedures by now to make that determination. Rather, it seeks
to examine the conditions whereby certain statements were seen to be true or false,
the concepts around which disciplines are organized ~1984: 12!.
15 On the science of the individual, see Foucault ~1979: 191!.
16 One Canadian pediatrician tells us that she uses “the growth charts with a grain of
salt” ~Owens, 2001!.
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